Guide 3 of 7Level One to Two
Who should hold the admin keys to the server?
Whoever holds administrator rights on a rented machine can change how it works above the floor, so the question is not only who is trustworthy but what the controls around those accounts require. This page sets ASD's Maturity Levels One and Two for privileged access side by side.
General information, not legal or security advice.
Level One and Level Two, side by side
ASD starts from the reason: users with administrative privileges for operating systems and applications can make significant changes to their configuration and operation, bypass critical security settings and access sensitive data. That is why restricting administrative privileges is one of the most effective mitigation strategies in ensuring the security of systems, and why it is worth more than a policy line on a dedicated server.
ASD's key actions for those accounts are four. Give administrative access only to staff who need it to perform their duties. Use separate administrator accounts for privileged tasks, and give users only the level of access they require. Review administrator accounts regularly, and remove access when it is no longer needed, when staff change roles, or when they leave. Protect the accounts themselves by limiting their internet access and using secure system administration practices. Apply the four and ASD's claim is measured rather than triumphant: security risks drop, accountability improves, and the operating environment becomes more secure and manageable.
Above those rules sit the Essential Eight's maturity levels, the model ASD publishes to support the framework's implementation. At Maturity Level One, the control is one rule: requests for privileged access to systems, applications and data repositories are validated when first requested. Maturity Level Two tightens the clock on the same accounts and adds three rules: privileged access to systems, applications and data repositories is disabled after 12 months unless revalidated; privileged access to systems and applications is disabled after 45 days of inactivity; and the credentials for break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts are long, unique, unpredictable and managed.
The Essential Eight itself is ASD's summary of the most effective of its mitigation strategies for protecting organisations against cyber threats, and its maturity levels run from zero to three. Nothing requires an organisation to have its implementation certified by an independent party unless a government directive or policy, a regulator, or a contract requires it. The levels are a ladder, in other words, not a certificate you must hold, unless a directive, a regulator or a contract asks for an independent assessment.
Validating privileged access
Validation is the control that ages worst, so it is worth seeing what each level actually asks. Level One asks once, at the start: privileged access is validated when it is first requested. Level Two asks again, on a clock and on silence: the access is disabled twelve months after the last validation, and it is disabled after 45 days without use, whatever the calendar says. Both rules share one idea, which is easier to remember than the numbers.
ASD's wider guidance explains what the restriction buys. Where administrative privileges are restricted, it becomes more difficult for malicious actors to elevate privileges, spread to other hosts, hide their existence, persist after a reboot, obtain sensitive data or resist removal efforts. It also names the threat plainly: one of the greatest threats to the security of networks is the compromise of privileged user accounts. On a server held alone, both points are about your own admin accounts.
Two smaller habits complete the picture. The credentials themselves should be long, unique, unpredictable and managed, for break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts alike. And the way people get in should be held to the same bar as what they can reach: at Maturity Level One, multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to their organisation's online services that process, store or communicate its sensitive data, where multi-factor authentication means something users have and something they know, or something they have unlocked by something they know or are. At Level Two, the multi-factor authentication used for authenticating users of online services is phishing-resistant. And at Level Two, the model logs the attempts: successful and unsuccessful multi-factor authentication events are centrally logged.
Where administrators work from
The ISM also answers a question that matters more on a dedicated server than on a fleet: from where should privileged work be done? Its answer starts by keeping the two jobs apart. Privileged human users use separate privileged and unprivileged operating environments, and using different physical workstations, one of them a dedicated Secure Admin Workstation, is the most secure approach to separating them.
The path to the server is narrowed the same way. A jump server, also known as a jump host or jump box, that allows only the necessary ports and services can be an effective way of simplifying and securing administrative activities, and administrative infrastructure is segregated from the wider network and the internet. Remote access and monitoring tools are the other half of the door: an organisation should develop, enforce and maintain a list of authorised remote monitoring and management tools and remote access tools, prevent the execution of those that are not authorised to the extent possible, and monitor for unusual or unexpected network activity associated with their use. Documentation and change discipline round it out: system administrators should document the requirements for administrative activities, consider the potential security impacts, obtain necessary approvals, notify affected parties of disruptions or outages, and maintain the system and cyber security documentation.
What the admin rail covers
The administration rail in the stack crosses every row, and the reason is one sentence from ASD: admin rights on operating systems and applications reach configuration and operation, the security settings around them, and the data they can reach. Where the rail meets the hatched band, the shared responsibility model applies to the keys as much as to the layers: strong authentication is on the list of duties that depend on the service you buy, and so are the credentials and secrets, which should be managed and short-lived and never stored in code repositories or configuration files. Whether the provider manages the admin path or hands it to you is one of the questions its responsibility document has to answer, and one of the reasons to read it before the contract.
There is one more provider-shaped question worth carrying from here into that conversation. ASD's system management guidance notes that the administration processes a provider runs are often opaque to its customers, and suggests that a customer should consider the provider's control plane to operate within a different security domain. On a dedicated server the practical translation is a question in the contract: which access path does the provider keep, and what does it record on it.
The whole stack, bottom to top (dedicated-servers.com.au home)